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COMMENT: A MORE OPTIMISTIC VIEW OF
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY
JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK'
As always in these matters, I am impressed by Professor Boshkoff's
scholarship, but depressed by his attitude. His paper' demonstrates that it
will be a daunting task to achieve cooperation, much less universalism, in
the general defaults of transnational enterprises. But the task is not
hopeless and cannot be left to our grandchildren.
The difference in the way Boshkoff and I view the same body of
evidence is best illustrated by three decisions in two cases that he does not
discuss: In re Axona 2 and In re Maxwell Communication Corp.3 These
cases, along with other cases in other jurisdictions,4 demonstrate a
remarkable level of cooperation in international insolvency in comparison
with the discouraging results accepted as inevitable just a few years ago.
When one considers these concrete results in the courts in conjunction with
the rapidly expanding international initiatives for reform in this field, the
prospects seem distinctly ungloomy.
Axona represents the global high tide of international cooperation in
* Benno C. Schmidt Chair of Business Law, The University of Texas School of Law.
1. Douglass G. Boshkoff, Some Gloom)' Thoughts Concerning Cross-Border Insolvencies, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 931 (1994).
2. In re Axona Int'l Credit & Commerce, Ltd., 88 B.R 597 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988), affd, 115
B.R. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), appeal dismissed, 924 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1991).
3. Final Supplemental Order Appointing Examiner, In re Maxwell Communication Corp., No.
91B15741 (TLB) (S.D.N.Y. January 15, 1992) (Brozman, J.) (copy in author's possession); Barclays
Bank PLC v. Homan, [1993] BCLC 680, [1992] BCC 757 (concerning anti-suit injunction sought
against Maxwell administrators in the United Kingdom). See In re Brierley, 145 B.R. 151 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992) (discussing, in a related "private side" case, cooperation in the Maxwell MCC case).
See also In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 151 B.R. 63 (reporting decision in related "private side"
case); In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 164 B.R. 858 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (same).
4. E.g., Judgment of Feb. 25, 1986 (Kleber v. Friis Hansen), Cass. civ. Ire, 1987 La Semaine
Juridique [J.C.P.] II No. 20,776 (Fr.); (See annotation by Judge Remery, 1987 La Semaine Juridique
ed. E, [J.C.P.] II No. 14,969 (stating foreign adjudication effective to invalidate an attachment lien
obtained subsequent to the foreign adjudication, but prior to any action by the foreign liquidator in
France)); Judgment of July 11, 1985 (P.N. KG u.a. v. RA 0) Entscheidungen des Bundegerichtshofes
in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 95 (F.R.G.) (giving effect to a Belgian bankruptcy for the purpose of entitling
the Belgian liquidator to claim a debt in Germany). See Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Transnational
Bankruptcies in the Late Eighties: A Tale of Evolution and Atavism in COMPARATIVE AND PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ON His SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY
409 (David S. Clark ed., 1990) [hereinafter Riesenfeld, Transnational Bankruptcies].
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insolvency cases. Arguably it overemphasized cooperation, but whether
correct or not, the case expresses a thorough rejection of parochialism and
a high level of commitment to achieving an international solution to
insolvency problems. I am one of several authors who have discussed this
case extensively elsewhere,5 so I will only summarize it here. The case
involved a Hong Kong bank. After the inception of its financial crisis, the
bank made various transfers to accounts in the United States that enabled
U.S. banks, including Chemical Bank, to use attachments and setoffs to
improve their positions. Within ninety days, insolvency proceedings were
commenced in both Hong Kong and the United States. The U.S.
Bankruptcy Trustee then brought preference actions against the U.S. banks.
The transfers apparently would have been recoverable if U.S. law applied.
The Axona court held that U.S. law could be applied to recover the
transfers. It then turned over the proceeds to be distributed in the Hong
Kong proceeding.' The effect was to force prominent United States
creditors to disgorge large amounts of money in favor of a Hong Kong
distribution that presumably included many creditors from other countries.
In the traditional world of territorialism and the "grab rule,"7 this result
would have been inconceivable.
A more recent and even more dramatic example of international
cooperation is reflected in a brace of decisions in the Maxwell Communica-
tion case, the huge international bankruptcy begun shortly after British
press magnate Robert Maxwell was found drowned near his yacht in
Spanish waters in 1991. The public part of his empire was managed
through Maxwell Communication Corporation (MCC). MCC was
incorporated in the United Kingdom and its executive offices were there,
but eighty percent of its revenues were derived from its holdings in the
United States Those holdings included companies important to U.S.
5. See Jay L. Westbrook, Choice ofAvoidance Law in Global Insolvencies, 17 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 499, 521 (199 1) [hereinafter Westbrook, Avoidance]; Riesenfield, Transnational Bankruptcies, supra
note 4, at 423-25; Henry Goodman et al., Use of United States Bankruptcy Law in Multinational
Insolvencies: The Axona Litigation-Issues, Tactics, and Implications for the Future, 9 BANKR. DEV.
J. 19 (1992).
6. Axona, 88 B.R. at 611.
7. The grab rule favors creditors who use local procedures to seize assets or initiate insolvency
proceedings over all other creditors. Local procedures control without regard to the typical commercial
conflict of law analysis. See Jay L. Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice
of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L. J. 457, 460 (1991) [hereinafter Westbrook, Theory];
Kurt Nadelmann, Revision of Conflicts Provisions in the American Bankruptcy Act, I INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 484, 487 (1952).
8. See Re Maxwell Communication Corp., [1992] BCLC 465, [1992] BCC 372.
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economic and cultural life, notably MacMillan Publishing and Official
Airline Guides, Inc.9 Thus, it was one of those rare cases in which there
could be plausible argument about which nation was the "home" country
of the defaulting enterprise. The management of MCC filed a Chapter 11
proceeding in the United States, apparently hoping to keep control of the
company during the proceedings. Shortly thereafter, administrators" were
appointed in the United Kingdom.
It appeared from the start that the Maxwell empire was riddled with
fraud, including huge amounts siphoned from British pension funds, and
many questionable transfers during the prebankruptcy financial crisis.1
Given these facts and the hybrid nationality of the debtor, the stage was set
for an all-out conflict between the U.S. and U.K. courts to control the
Maxwell assets and to protect the thousands of creditors, employees, and
stockholders in each country. Remarkably, that conflict was averted and
the Maxwell worldwide holdings have been administered in a cooperative
spirit-distilled comity.
The first of two key decisions was made almost immediately by Judge
Brozman in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New
York. Presented with conflicting demands for control of the Chapter 11
case, she appointed an Examiner, Richard Gitlin of the Connecticut bar.
Examiners have been given an amazing variety ofjobs under the Bankrupt-
cy Code,' but Gitlin's assignment was unique. In effect, he was charged
with negotiating the terms of a joint administration of this global bankrupt-
cy with the English administrators. The latter were less than charmed with
this arrangement, but because of the potentially huge savings associated
with avoiding a tug-of-assets between the two court systems, they
9. The "private" companies also included important U.S. assets, especially the New York Daily
News. See In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 164 B.R. 858, 861 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993).
10. "Administration" is a new procedure in the United Kingdom created under the Insolvency Act
1986. It has some of the same purposes as Chapter II reorganization in the United States. See Jay L.
Westbrook, A Comparison of United Kingdom Administration and Chapter 11 in the United States, 6
INSOLVENCY L. & PRAC. 86 (London 1991).
11. In re Brierley, 145 B.R. 151, 156-57, 164 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).
12. The creation of the examiner position, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104(b), 1106(b) (1988), has turned out
to be one of the most important and flexible reforms of the 1978 Code, providing a variety of functions
never dreamed by its drafters. See, e.g., In re Revco, 118 B.R. 468 app. (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990)
(Zarctsky, Examiner) (reporting a possible attack on a leveraged buyout as a fraudulent conveyance);
hI re Franklin-Lee Homes, Inc., 102 B.R. 477, 481 (E.D.N.C. 1989) (holding that an examiner may be
appointed to bring preference actions).
1994]
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negotiated.13 The result was a "protocol" that left the English in charge
of the case, but provided the U.S. Examiner with a right to consult and
object. 4
Not only has this remarkable arrangement permitted the case to be
administered efficiently and without jurisdictional litigation, but it has
resulted in a joint Scheme of Arrangement and Plan of Reorganization, in
the British and U.S. proceedings respectively. 5 It is the first truly
worldwide bankruptcy reorganization, and it has been accomplished in a
case filled with controversy and fraud. That achievement is simply
stunning.
A pessimistic observer might try to dismiss this monument to coopera-
tion because it involves the liquidation of the debtor companies.' 6  Yet
cooperation in this case proved essential to maintaining the value of the
enterprises to be sold and to avoiding potentially ruinous cost, and even
more ruinous delay, through transnational litigation.' 7  Cooperation was
needed and it was achieved.
One of the areas in which litigation has arisen is the claim by the joint
administrators, supported by the Examiner, that payments made by MCC
to two British banks (and a French one) were preferences. With a total of
more than $100 million at stake, it is not surprising that one of the
defendants, Barclays Bank PLC, sought an injunction in the English courts
to bar the English administrators from bringing a preference action against
it in the U.S. Chapter 11 case. The British court (Justice Hoffmann, as he
then was) refused the injunction and held that it was up to the U.S. courts
to select the proper law to apply to the challenged transfers. The decision
was upheld by the Court of Appeals, largely on the basis of the trial court
13. During a visit to London in 1992, I was struck by the general resentment found there toward
the requirement that the administrators deal with the U.S. Examiner and the U.S. Bankruptcy Court.
I was surprised, because I expected congratulations on the U.S. deferral. I have the impression that the
U.K. attitude may have warmed since. See, e.g., Editorial, 9 INSOLVENCY L. & PRAC. 57 (London
1993).
14. These events are described briefly in an opinion in the "private" cases. In re Brierley, 145
B.R. 151, 164 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).
15. Confirmation Order, In re Maxwell Communication Corp., No. 91B15741 (TLB) (S.D.N.Y.
July 23, 1993) (on file with the author).
16. Actually, the holding companies are being liquidated, but the operating companies are being
sold as going concerns, so U.S. experts would snort and sputter as to whether it was a liquidation or
not.
17. Cf. Kilbarr Corp. v. Business Sys. Inc., B.V., 990 F.2d 83, 84 (3d Cir. 1993) (revealing a
twelve-year lapse between decisions over international rights to intellectual property in Netherlands-U.S.
insolvency).
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opinion."
This second decision was in some ways even more important than the
original U.S. decision to defer to British administration, because an earlier
U.K. judgment, Felixstowe Dock and Railway Co. v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 9
had created serious concerns about the willingness of British courts to
cooperate in cases with a center of gravity in the United States. The
Barclays judgment seems to confirm the U.K.'s interest in cooperation in
transnational cases, especially in cases such as this in which the United
States had deferred first and most generally.2"
Set in this context, the decision in the Koreag case2 can be seen for
what it is: an unfortunate blunder, but by no means a harbinger of future
decisions. The case was wrong for just the reasons that Professor Boshkoff
asserts,2 but the mistake-applying two-party notions of equity in the
multiparty, collective context of bankruptcy-was of the type that
nonbankruptcy courts often make in domestic cases.23 Koreag does not
demonstrate any specific hostility to the concept of international coopera-
tion. The process of cooperation will inevitably progress "two steps
18. Barclays Bank PLC v. Homan, [1993] BCLC 680, [1992] BCC 757. Since the Conference,
the U.S. preference actions in Maxwell have been decided by Judge Brozman of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of New York, who granted motions to dismiss by all three bank
defendants. In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 170 B.R. 800 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994). I should
disclose that I participated in that action as an amicus curie appointed by the court, but I do not believe
that my role would have any special impact on my views for present purposes.
19. Felixstowe Dock & Railway Co. v. U.S. Lines, Inc., [1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 76 (refusing to
defer to United States Chapter 11 reorganization proceeding). See Westbrook, Theory, supra note 7,
at 478; Ian F. Fletcher, The Ascendence of Comity from the Ashes of Felixstowe Dock, INSOLVENCY
INTELLIGENCE, Feb. 1993, at 10 (1993).
20. However, it should be noted that the Barclays decision was also consistent with British
doctrine that carefully and generously refrains from cross-border anti-litigation injunctions in most cases.
See, e.g., British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways, Ltd., [1984] 3 W.L.R. 413, [1984] A.C. 58. There was
one earlier U.K. case, also decided by Justice Hoffman, that refused an injunction in favor of
cooperation with a U.S. bankruptcy court. Banque Indosuez S.A. v. Ferromet Resources, Inc., [1993]
BCLC 112.
21. In re Koreag, Controle et Revision, S.A., 961 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1992).
22. Boshkoff, supra note 1, at 937-38 nn.29-32. See also Donald T. Trautman, Jay L. Westbrook
& Emmanuel Gaillard, Four Models of International Bankruptcy, 41 AM. J. COMP. L. 573, 620 (1993)
[hereinafter Models]; Jay L. Westbrook & Donald T. Trautman, Conflict OfLaws Issues In International
Insolvencies, in CuRRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE INSOLVENCY LAW
(Clarendon Press 1994) [hereinafter Conflicts]. Of course, the result could have been the same even
if the court had done the right thing and deferred to the Swiss bankruptcy court for resolution of the
issues presented. Conflicts, supra, at n.31; Models, supra, at 621.
23. See, e.g., Emily L. Sherwin, Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 297,327.
1994]
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forward, one back."'24 If Koreag is a step backward, Maxwell is at least
two steps forward-maybe three.25
In addition to progressive case law, we can be encouraged by a number
of international efforts at reform and greater cooperation. The re-
emergence of a serious European effort to forge a bankruptcy convention
is a hopeful development, despite all the obvious difficulties that exist.26
The Council of Europe has promulgated a treaty (the Istanbul treaty) that
has lighted the way forward27 and stimulated a renewal of efforts within
the European Union (EU), even though the Istanbul treaty itself will
probably not be adopted. The EU Committee has issued a series of new
drafts28 and seems quite bent on success.
Since the Conference at Washington University, two new international
reform projects have been launched. In April 1994, the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) sponsored a
meeting in Vienna to discuss the possibility of a new U.N.-sponsored effort
to achieve some preliminary international agreements in the insolvency
area. It was agreed in Vienna to go forward with an effort to achieve some
initial procedural reforms, notably cross-border recognition. 9
24. It is troubling that the Second Circuit in Koreag was more reluctant to embrace cooperation
than the lower courts. As in the domestic context, the nonbankruptcy judges may be slower to
recognize that the collective process of bankruptcy, with a single worldwide pie to divide, is a different
context for choice of law decisions than is individualized dispute resolution in ordinary transnational
litigation. On the other hand, one might hope that their distance from bankruptcy doctrine and
convention would give them a broader sense of the public policy importance of international coopera-
tion.
25. There is additional reason for optimism in two more recent cases: In re Ocana, 151 B.R. 670
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993), and In re Rubin, 160 B.R. 269 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993). In Ocana, the court
perhaps should have deferred to the Panamanian court to resolve issues concerning an insurance trust,
but the fact that it was a New York statutory trust provided such strong grounds for applying New York
law in the existing New York forum that the decision is easily justified. See Conflicts, supra note 22,
at 665-67. The court demonstrated its appreciation of this rather subtle point in Rubin, where it deferred
to an Israeli insolvency proceeding concerning an insurance trust. The Rubin court distinguished Ocana
precisely because of the statutory nature of the trust in that case. 160 B.R. at 275 n.7. See also Blanco
v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela, S.A., 997 F.2d 974, 980 (2d Cir. 1993) (deferring, under forum non
conveniens, to Venezuelan insolvency proceeding, although with certain conditions); In re Spanish Cay
Co., 161 B.R. 715, 719 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993) (deferring to Bahamian bankruptcy).
26. The difficulties are well documented in Professor Fletcher's discussion of the 1980 EC draft.
IAN F. FLETCHER, CONFLICT OF LAWS AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW ch. 6 (1982).
27. Council of Europe, European Convention on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy,
Europ. T.S. No. 136, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 165 (1991). The Convention was ready for signature on
June 5, 1990, and has been signed by Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, and Turkey.
28. See Models, supra note 22, at 573 n.2.
29. See UNITED NATIONS, COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, CROSS-BORDER
INSOLVENCY: NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT, REPORT ON UNCITRAL-INSOL COLLOQUIUM ON CROSS-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss3/13
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In May 1994, the American Law Institute (ALI) announced an initiative
in the international insolvency field. Its new project is designed to increase
regional cooperation in insolvency matters among the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries by developing Model Procedures for
cooperation among the courts of the three NAFTA countries.30 The
importance of this project is underscored by the fact that it is the first truly
international project undertaken by the ALI. It will involve reporters and
advisory committees in each of the three countries. Each national reporter
and committee will produce: (a) national reports concerning domestic and
transnational insolvency law in that country, and (b) proposed procedures
for cooperation developed in tandem but tailored for use in each country's
courts.
A cynic might restate these developments: We must quicken our efforts
to reform transnational insolvency to keep up with the mushrooming sales
of financial derivatives.3 ' The growth of international markets, and
especially the globalization of financial markets, has indeed given a sense
of urgency to efforts to reform international judicial cooperation in
insolvency cases. The development of ever more sophisticated and
complex financial instruments traded increasingly on utterly impersonal
international markets has indeed increased the risk of transnational financial
failure.32 Unlike Professor Boshkoff, I think there is every indication that
these needs are widely perceived and that knowledgeable people and
important institutions around the world are moving rapidly to create a better
system of transnational insolvency. If I may repeat here what I have
previously written:
If we can help to create such a system, our reward will be to make an
important contribution to the historic evolution now taking place, the binding-
together of a world of nation states by the sturdy cables of commerce."3
BORDER INSOLVENCY, U.N. Doe. A/CN.9/398 (May 19, 1994). Richard Gitlin, the Examiner in
Mavell, is leading the UNCITRAL reform effort in the United States.
30. THE A.L.I. REP., Spring 1994, at 5.
31. Derivative financial instruments have been the cause of large losses to nonfinancial
corporations recently, notably Procter and Gamble. See, e.g., Steven Lipin et al., Portfolio Poker, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 14, 1994 at Al, C6. There have been calls for increased international regulation of
derivatives to protect financial institutions and investors. See Henry Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives:
The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of Regulatoy Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J.
1457, 1505 (1993). See also SEC Chief Levitt Warns Mutual Funds To Be Cautious in Handling
Derivatives, WALL ST. J., June 21, 1994 at B2, C3.
32. The scandal in Britain involving municipalities and derivatives was surely an early warning.
See Hu, supra note 31, at 1487.
33. See Westbrook, Avoidance, supra note 5, at 538.
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